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TEXAS V. COBB: A NARROW ROAD AHEAD FOR THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
I. INTRODUCTION
Raymond Cobb ("Cobb") stabbed sixteen-month-old Kori Rae
Owings's mother in the stomach while he was attempting to steal
the stereo from their home.' He then took the mother's body into
the woods behind the house.2 As Cobb later confessed:
I went back to her house and I saw the baby laying on its bed. I took
the baby out there and it was sleeping the whole time. I laid the baby
down on the ground four or five feet away from its mother. I went
back to my house and got a flat edge shovel. That's all I could find.
Then I went back over to where they were and I started digging a
hole between them. After I got the hole dug, the baby was awake. It
started going toward its mom and it fell in the hole. I put the lady in
the hole and I covered them up. I remember stabbing a different
knife I had in the ground where they were. I was crying right then.
3
Cobb's story illustrates one of the most serious problems facing
America today: crime. As a result, a top priority of our govern-
ment is convicting criminals. But even baby killers like Raymond
Cobb have constitutional rights, and the courts are charged with
protecting those rights. Society must balance its right to be pro-
tected from crime with the rights of the accused.4 To preserve the
integrity of the American adversarial system, the accused must
be treated fairly. Otherwise, society will be the ultimate loser.'
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution de-
clares that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
1. Texas v. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. 1335, 1339 (2001).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1339-40 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. A-9 to A-10).
4. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 481 (1966) ('This Court, while protect-
ing individual rights, has always given ample latitude to law enforcement agencies in the
legitimate exercise of their duties.").
5. See Charles J. Ogletree, Comment, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A
Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1842 n.91 (1987).
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the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
The United States Supreme Court views the right to counsel as
indispensable to the fair administration of our adversarial system
of criminal justice.' However, the Sixth Amendment, like most
constitutional provisions, offers little guidance for determining
the limits of its protections. The Constitution remains silent as to
when the right to counsel attaches as well as the scope of protec-
tion afforded by the right once it does attach. Over the years, the
Court has attempted to interpret and define the right to counsel.
Recently, the Court limited the right to counsel in Texas v.
Cobb,8 holding that a person, already charged with a crime and
represented by a lawyer, can be questioned by police without his
lawyer present, so long as the questioning is technically directed
at a different offense than the one charged.9 Prior to Cobb, a
growing number of federal and state courts recognized the
"closely related" exception ° by allowing the Sixth Amendment
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment was made applicable to the states
by incorporation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
7. See generally Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632 (1986) (holding that the
Sixth Amendment limits police from using techniques to gather information from accused
that may otherwise have been permitted earlier in investigation); Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412, 430 (1986) (holding that the Sixth Amendment is applicable only when govern-
ment's role shifts from investigation to accusation through initiation of adversary judicial
proceedings); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985) (stating that "to deprive a person
of counsel during the period prior to trial may be more damaging than denial of counsel
during the trial itself'); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977) (indicating that once
adversary proceedings have started, the accused has a right to counsel while he is being
interrogated); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972) (noting that the Sixth Amend-
ment "attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been ini-
tiated against him"); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (holding that the
accused was denied Sixth Amendment protections "when there was used against him at
his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately
elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel"); Gideon,
372 U.S. at 344 (stating that "the right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be
deemed fimdamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours"); Pow-
ell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (reasoning that the accused "requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him").
8. 121 S. Ct. 1335 (2001).
9. Id. at 1339.
10. For purposes of clarity, this note uses "closely related" to refer to this exception.
Courts have used the terms "closely related," "extremely closely related," and "inextricably
intertwined," all of which apparently mean the same thing. See United States v. Arnold,
106 F.3d 37, 41 (3d Cir. 1997) (characterizing "closely related" and "inextricably inter-
twined" as "two terms which we take to mean the same thing"); see also United States v.
Carpenter, 963 F.2d 736, 740 (5th Cir. 1992) (considering "inextricably intertwined" and
"extremely closely related" to be equivalent); United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257
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right to counsel to attach to a charge that was "'extremely closely
related to pending... charges.""' Despite these lower court rul-
ings, the Cobb Court narrowly interpreted the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel by eliminating the "closely related" exception.'
2
This note discusses the evolution of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel and ultimately concludes that Cobb reflects the Court's
ongoing merger of Fifth and Sixth Amendment analyses. Part II
explores the development of the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel, the recognition of a "closely related" exception, and the Fifth
Amendment right to counsel. Part III sets out the facts and hold-
ing in Cobb. Part IV analyzes the Court's narrow interpretation of
the Sixth Amendment in Cobb. Part V discusses the potential im-
pact of the Cobb holding.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
During the past forty years, the Supreme Court, along with
other federal and state courts, has tried to define the scope of the
Sixth Amendment. In Kirby v. United States," the Supreme
Court determined that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel "at-
taches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceed-
ings have been initiated." 4 The Kirby plurality held that its test
(9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (using "inextricably intertwined"); Whittlesey v. State, 665
A.2d 223, 233 (Md. 1995) (using "closely related"), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1148 (1996).
11. United States v. Williams, 993 F.2d 451, 457 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting United
States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 744 (5th Cir. 1991)).
12. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1340-41.
13. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
14. Id. at 688 (citations omitted). The Court emphasized the importance of the initia-
tion ofjudicial criminal proceedings to Sixth Amendment jurisprudence:
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism. It
is the starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For it
is only then that the government has committed itself to prosecute, and only
then that the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified.
It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of
organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and proce-
dural criminal law. It is this point, therefore, that marks the commencement
of the "criminal prosecutions" to which alone the explicit guarantees of the
Sixth Amendment are applicable.
Id. at 689-90.
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comprehensively included all prior cases in which the Court had
found a Sixth Amendment right to counsel.15 As a result, the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to all critical stages of
the criminal process between the State and the accused. 6 Once
the right attaches, any subsequent waiver during a police-
initiated custodial interview is presumptively invalid.'
1. The Court Creates an Exclusionary Rule
Massiah v. United States8 marked a seminal decision of the
Supreme Court by requiring the exclusion of evidence obtained in
violation of an accused's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 9 Af-
ter being indicted for violating federal narcotics laws, Massiah re-
tained a lawyer, entered a plea of not guilty, and was released on
bail.20 A few days later, Massiah's co-defendant, Colson, cooper-
ated with government agents by allowing them to install a radio
transmitter in his car. Massiah and Colson eventually had a
conversation in the car.22 Massiah made incriminating state-
ments which were recorded by police and used against him at
15. Id. at 688. These cases include Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (plu-
rality opinion) (right to counsel attached at pre-indictment preliminary hearing), United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967) (right to counsel attached at post-indictment,
pretrial line-up), Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (right to counsel at-
tached at post-indictment interrogation), and Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53-54
(1961) (right to counsel attached at arraignment).
16. Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-37. The Wade Court defined the critical stage in the crimi-
nal process as the point "where the results might well settle the accused's fate and reduce
the trial itself to a mere formality," id. at 224, or where a "potential substantial prejudice
to defendant's rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to
help avoid that prejudice." Id. at 227.
17. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986). The burden is on the government
to prove "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
18. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
19. Id. at 206. The Court stated:
We hold that the petitioner was denied the basic protections of [the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel] when there was used against him at his trial
evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliber-
ately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of coun-
sel.
Id.
20. Id. at 201.
21. Id. at 202-03.
22. Id. at 203.
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trial.23 The Court concluded that the statements "could not consti-
tutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against [Mas-
siah] at his trial."24 As a result, the Court created an exclusionary
rule to the Sixth Amendment.
The Massiah Court held that the violation of the right to coun-
sel was not complete until the prosecution attempted to admit the
illegally procured evidence at trial.26 The Sixth Amendment spe-
cifically addresses procedural aspects of prosecution and trial;
therefore, the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the
right to counsel infringes upon that constitutional right.2
This placed the Massiah exclusionary rule on a different level2
than the exclusionary rule established in Miranda v. Arizona,29
23. Id.
24. Id. at 207.
25. See id. at 204.
26. See id. at 207 ("All that we hold is that the defendant's own incriminating state-
ments, obtained by federal agents under the circumstances here disclosed, could not con-
stitutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against him at his trial."). The dissent
described the Court's holding as creating "a constitutional rule... barring the use of evi-
dence." Id. at 208 (White, J., dissenting).
27. See Steven J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 889
(1981). Professor Schulhofer claims:
[Tihe Massiah "exclusionary rule"... is not intended to deter any pretrial
behavior whatsoever. Rather, Massiah explicitly permits government efforts
to obtain information from an indicted suspect, so long as that information is
not used "as evidence against him at his trial." The failure to exclude evi-
dence, therefore, cannot be considered collateral to some more fundamental
violation. Instead it is the admission at trial that in itself denies the constitu-
tional right.
Id. (quoting Massiah, 377 U.S. at 207).
28. Similarly, the exclusionary rule articulated in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
is considered to be on "very different footing" than the rule established by Massiah. Silas
Wasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was it a
Fair Trial?, 22 A. CRIm. L. REV. 85, 175 (1984). Mapp held that evidence taken by state
officials in violation of the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures was inadmissible in state court proceedings. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. As in the
application of Miranda, the exclusionary rule that attaches to a Mapp violation is not com-
pelled by the Constitution:
The current conception of Mapp is that a fourth amendment violation is com-
plete when the police withdraw from the area they have searched. The evi-
dentiary fruits of that illegal search may, later, be excluded from court, but
the point is not that their admission would violate any personal right of the
person aggrieved.... It is, rather, that excluding this evidence today will
tend to discourage the police from violating somebody else's fourth amend-
ment rights tomorrow.
Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra at 175.
29. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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the landmark Supreme Court decision requiring the suppression
of evidence acquired in violation of the Fifth Amendment."
Unlike Massiah, evidence acquired in violation of Miranda may
be used against a defendant without violating the Constitution.3'
Overshadowed by Miranda, Massiah's potential reach was "lost
in the shuffle," 2 and the decision remained dormant for over a
decade. The first major application of Massiah occurred in Brewer
v. Williams," which was decided thirteen years after Massiah. In
Brewer, the defendant was charged and arraigned in Davenport,
Iowa, for the abduction of a ten-year-old girl. 4 A Des Moines law-
yer had previously informed officers in Des Moines that he repre-
sented Williams." After the arraignment in Davenport, however,
another lawyer instructed Williams not to speak to the police un-
til he had conferred with his lawyer in Des Moines; the attorney
also instructed the police not to question Williams until he could
meet with his other lawyer.36 The police placed Williams in the
back seat of a squad car and two officers drove him to Des
Moines.37 During the trip, one of the officers, Detective Leam-
ing-who knew Williams to be a former mental patient and a
deeply religious person-mentioned that the parents of the victim
should be entitled to a Christian burial for their daughter. 8
Shortly thereafter, Williams, without the presence of counsel, di-
rected the officers to the location of the girl's body. Subse-
quently, Williams was indicted for murder. °
The Court viewed the situation in Brewer as indistinguishable
from the "clear rule of Massiah... that once adversary proceed-
ings have commenced against an individual, he has a right to le-
30. For further discussion of Miranda, see infra notes 101-18 and accompanying text.
31. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (holding that the procedural
safeguards established in Miranda "were not themselves rights protected by the Constitu-
tion but were instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-
incrimination was protected").
32. Schulhofer, supra note 27, at 884 (quoting YALE KAAISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION
AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 160 (1980)).
33. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
34. Id. at 390.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 391-92.
37. Id. at 392.
38. Id. at 392-93.
39. Id. at 393.
40. Id.
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gal representation when the government interrogates him."4 The
Court noted that "[diespite Williams' express and implicit asser-
tions of his right to counsel, Detective Learning proceeded to elicit
incriminating statements from Williams."42 Such considerations
led the Court to conclude that "so clear a violation of the Sixth...
Amendment as here occurred cannot be condoned."" Accordingly,
the Court held that
the right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer
at, or after, the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated
against him-"whether by way of formal ch ge, preliminary hear-
ing, indictment, information, or arraignment.
As a result, the Court extended the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel to the statements relevant to the murder charge against
Williams, even though the right to counsel had only formally at-
tached to the abduction charge.45
In Maine v. Moulton," a case factually similar to Massiah, the
Court upheld the suppression of incriminating statements for two
separate charges.' Defendants Moulton and Colson were indicted
on four counts of theft.' Over a year and a half later, Colson con-
tacted the local police, confessed his participation in the thefts,
41. Id. at 401. It should be noted that these proceedings concerned the abduction
charge and not the murder charge for which Williams was later convicted. Id. at 390, 395.
42. Id. at 405.
43. Id. at 406.
44. Id. at 398 (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)). Chief Justice Bur-
ger, writing in dissent, believed that "[tIhe result in this case ought to be intolerable in
any society which purports to call itself an organized society." Id. at 415 (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting). Burger argued that the Sixth Amendment was meant to serve as a constitutional
guarantor of an incorrupt fact-finding process and a fair trial. Id. at 426 (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting). Burger concluded that the suppression of Williams' statements was unjustified
because the facts surrounding the statements implicated "no issue either of fairness or
evidentiary reliability." Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In a separate dissent, Justice White
also emphasized that conditions which he felt the right to counsel was designed to protect
were not present in this case. See id. at 433-34 (White, J., dissenting). Because "the offi-
cers' conduct did not, and was not likely to, jeopardize the fairness of [Williams'] trial or in
any way risk the conviction of an innocent man," the statements should not have been
suppressed as fruits of that conduct. Id. at 437 (White, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 404-06. The Court held that Williams' waiver of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel was invalid and that the statements he made to the police identifying the body's
location were inadmissible. Id
46. 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
47. Id. at 180.
48. Id. at 162.
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and agreed to cooperate in the prosecution of Moulton.4 9 Colson
also informed the police of additional thefts and an inchoate plan
devised by Moulton to kill an opposing witness. ° Though the po-
lice knew that Moulton's right to counsel had attached to the
theft charge, the police placed a recording device on Colson's tele-
phone and wired Colson to record conversations between himself
and Moulton.51 The trial court convicted Moulton of burglary and
theft, despite his efforts to suppress the recorded statements.52
However, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reversed his convic-
tions and remanded the case for a new trial,53 and the state ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court. 54
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Maine Su-
preme Judicial Court, explaining that "to deprive a person of
counsel during the period prior to trial may be more damaging
than denial of counsel during the trial itself."55 The Court clari-
fied that once the right to counsel has attached, "the prosecutor
and police have an affirmative obligation not to act in a manner
that circumvents and thereby dilutes the protection afforded by
the right to counsel."56 Consequently, the Court concluded that
the police violated Moulton's Sixth Amendment right to counsel
by recording conversations in which the police "knew that Moul-
ton would make statements that he had a constitutional right not
to make to their agent prior to consulting with counsel."" The
Court affirmed the state appellate court's decision to suppress the
statements regarding the pending theft charges, but stated that
evidence regarding an alleged plan to kill a witness may be ad-
missible in separate proceedings because such charges had not
yet commenced at the time the recordings were made.5" Fairness
interests, the Court reasoned, required the right to counsel be
applied to certain pretrial proceedings unless the "results [there]
49. Id. at 162-63. In exchange for his help, the police informed Colson that no addi-
tional charges would be brought against him. Id. at 163.
50. Id. at 165.
51. Id. at 163-67.
52. Id. at 166-67.
53. Maine v. Moulton, 481 A.2d 155 (Me. 1984).
54. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 168.
55. Id. at 170.
56. Id. at 171.
57. Id. at 177.
58. See id. at 180.
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might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a
mere formality."59
2. The Court Defines the Sixth Amendment as Offense-Specific
In McNeil v. Wisconsin,6 ° the Supreme Court limited the pro-
tection provided by the Sixth Amendment by announcing that the
right to counsel is "offense specific.""' McNeil was arrested in Ne-
braska for an armed robbery that occurred in West Allis, Wiscon-
sin.62 Authorities transferred him back to Wisconsin and ap-
pointed him counsel." Thereafter, a detective questioned McNeil
regarding an unrelated murder, attempted murder, and armed
burglary in Caledonia, Wisconsin.64 McNeil admitted involvement
in these events,65 and police later formally charged McNeil with
these crimes.66 The trial court denied McNeil's motion to suppress
his incriminating statements.61
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged
that McNeil's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached for
the initial armed robbery charge, but stated that the right is "of-
fense specific."6 ' Because McNeil made his statements before he
had been formally charged, arraigned, or indicted for the Caledo-
nia crimes, the Court concluded that his right to counsel relating
to those offenses had not yet attached.69 The Court explained that
"[the Sixth Amendment right to counsel] cannot be invoked once
for all future prosecutions, for it does not attach until a prosecu-
59. Id. at 170 (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967)).
60. 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
61. Id. at 175.
62. Id. at 173.
63. Id. A public defender represented McNeil at a bail hearing for an armed robbery
charge in West Allis, Wisconsin. Id. at 173-74.
64. Id. at 173-74. The detectives questioned McNeil three times. Id. Each time, the
police advised him of his Miranda rights, and he signed waiver forms and typed copies of
his statements. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 174.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 175. Justice Stevens viewed the offense-specific description of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel as inconsistent with legal precedent and "the ordinary under-
standing of the scope of the right and accepted practice." Id. at 184 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).
69. See id. at 175-76.
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tion is commenced."" Hence, a person questioned by government
officials does not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel with
respect to unrelated offenses if prosecution has not commenced on
those charges, nor does an earlier invocation of the Sixth
Amendment activate the Miranda-Fifth Amendment right re-
garding unrelated offenses.71
B. The "Closely Related" Exception to the Offense-Specific Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel
Prior to McNeil, lower courts reasoned that the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel may attach to "'closely related' but un-
charged offenses."72 In one of the first decisions implementing this
exception, People v. Clankie,73 the Supreme Court of Illinois de-
clared that the Moulton Court 4 had recognized that charged of-
fenses can be "so closely related to certain offenses for which for-
mal charges have not been made that the right to counsel for the
charged offenses cannot constitutionally be isolated from the
right to counsel for the uncharged offense."75 The Clankie court
explained that the United States Supreme Court recognized this
principle by affirming the state appellate court's decision to va-
cate both Moulton's theft and burglary convictions even though
the defendant had not been charged with burglary at the time of
the incriminating statements.76 Furthermore, the court observed
that the United States Supreme Court applied the same principle
70. Id. at 175.
71. See id. at 177. See generally Note, Supreme Court Review: Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments-The Right to Counsel in Multiple Charge Arraignments, 82 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 904, 915 (1992) (arguing that the McNeil Court correctly refused to allow
invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to imply invocation of the Fifth
Amendment). But see Craig R. Johnson, Note, McNeil v. Wisconsin Blurring a Bright Line
on Custodial Interrogation, 1992 WIs. L. REV. 1643, 1660-63 (1992) (predicting that
McNeil will undermine earlier decisions that strongly protected the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 1342-43 (10th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Nocella, 849 F.2d 33, 37-38 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Louis, 679 F.
Supp. 705, 709 (W.D. Mich. 1988); People v. Clankie, 530 N.E.2d 448, 451-53 (Ill. 1988);
People v. Hoskins, 523 N.E.2d 80, 83-84 (111. App. Ct. 1988).
73. 530 N.E.2d 448 (Ill. 1988).
74. 474 U.S. 159 (1985). See supra notes 46-59 and accompanying text.
75. Clankie, 530 N.E.2d at 451.
76. Id.
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in Brewer v. Williams7 by barring the use of Williams's admis-
sion in his murder trial despite the fact that, at the time of the
admission, he had been indicted only for abduction.7" The Illinois
court stated that "[t]he United States Supreme Court has thus
apparently assumed that sixth amendment [sic] rights of one
formally charged with an offense extend to offenses closely re-
lated to that offense and for which a defendant is subsequently
formally accused."79
The United States Supreme Court's opinion in McNeil ap-
peared to put an end to the "closely related" exception. 0 However,
only six months after the McNeil decision, the Fifth Circuit, in
United States v. Cooper,"' acknowledged that some courts still be-
lieved Moulton provided for a "closely related" exception, al-
though the facts in the case at bar did not support a reversal of
the defendant's conviction. 2 Moreover, other federal courts con-
tinued to recognize the "closely related" exception. 3 For example,
77. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
78. Clankie, 530 N.E.2d at 451.
79. Id. at 452.
80. See supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of McNeil v. Wis-
consin and the Sixth Amendment as "offense-specific."
81. 949 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 975 (1992).
82. Id. at 743-44. The state charged Cooper with aggravated robbery. Id. at 740. Six
days later, a federal agent interrogated Cooper about his possession of a firearm during
the robbery. Id. Cooper confessed to possession of an unlicensed firearm and was indicted
on federal charges. Id. at 740-41. Cooper argued that the federal agent's questioning vio-
lated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. at 743. The Fifth Circuit held that al-
though the federal and state prosecutions would use the same evidence, they involved dif-
ferent conduct and were not "extremely closely related." Id. at 744.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d 1219, 1223-26 (9th Cir. 1999)
(noting that a state kidnapping charge was closely related to federal charges of transport-
ing and moving illegal alien); United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d. 769, 776 (6th Cir. 1997)
(indicating that a tribal statutory rape charge was based on same underlying conduct as
federal charges of engaging in sexual act), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 917 (1998); United States
v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37, 40-42 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that witness intimidation was closely
related to attempted murder of a witness); United States v. Laury, 49 F.3d 145, 150 n.11
(5th Cir. 1995) (holding that where the federal and state charges are identical, invocation
of Sixth Amendment right on state charges is sufficient to invoke the right on the federal
charges); United States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 33 (4th Cir. 1993) (reasoning that a cocaine
distribution conspiracy ending in May 1992 was not inextricably intertwined with a sub-
sequent cocaine sale in August 1992), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1059 (1994); United States v.
Williams, 993 F.2d 451, 456-57 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that perjury is "not extremely
closely related" to drug conspiracy); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1104 (9th Cir.
1992) (indicating that a charge of flight to avoid prosecution on a Los Angeles murder
charge was not inextricably intertwined with a San Francisco murder charges); United
States v. Carpenter, 963 F.2d 736, 740-41 (5th Cir. 1992) (concluding that a burglary
charge was not closely related to possession of firearm by a felon since the crimes took
2002]
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the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Hines' stated that "[an ex-
ception to the offense-specific requirement of the Sixth Amend-
ment occurs when the pending charge is so inextricably inter-
twined with the charge under investigation that the right to
counsel for the pending charge cannot constitutionally be isolated
from the right to counsel for the uncharged offense." 5 In United
States v. Kidd,6 the Fourth Circuit also recognized the exception
by stating that "in order to fall within [this exception], the offense
being investigated must derive from the same factual predicate as
the charged offense.""7 As recently as 1997, the Third Circuit
found the exception applicable to the facts in United States v. Ar-
nold,8 8 which involved separate charges of witness intimidation
and attempted murder.8 9 The court stated that "[g]iven that [the
defendant's] central purpose and the intended results of both of-
fenses were the same, we cannot but conclude that the two of-
fenses were sufficiently related for purposes of the Sixth Amend-
ment exception."9"
Despite the ruling in McNeil, state courts also continued to im-
plement the offense-specific exception.9 In In re Pack,92 one of the
place at different times and the firearm was not linked to the burglary); United States v.
Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257-58 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (holding that a pending Decem-
ber offense was not logically distinct from an uncharged January offense because the of-
fenses involved different people, places and times).
84. 963 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
85. Id. at 257 (citing Cooper, 949 F.2d at 737). The court distinguished the defendant's
activities in two separate months. Even though the same offense was charged in both in-
stances, the time, place, and persons involved were all different. Id. Therefore, the court
held, for Sixth Amendment purposes, that the offenses were "separate and distinct." Id. at
257-58.
86. 12 F.3d 30 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1059 (1994).
87. Id. at 33. The court intimated that a Sixth Amendment violation could have re-
sulted if the drug exchange had not "involved a different purchaser-informant, occurred at
a different time, and took place in a different location." See id.
88. 106 F.3d 37 (3d Cir. 1997).
89. Id. at 42.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., People v. Spivey, 615 N.E.2d 852, 854-55 (Ill. 1993) (concluding that
crimes occurring a year apart were not closely related); Whittlesey v. State, 665 A.2d 223,
232-36 (Md. 1995) (holding that a false statement charge was not closely related to a
murder charge), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1148 (1996); Commonwealth v. Rainwater, 681
N.E.2d 1218, 1223-24 (Mass. 1997) (holding that auto thefts were not inextricably inter-
twined), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1095 (1998); In re Pack, 616 A.2d 1006, 1010 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992) (holding that a burglary charge was closely related to charges of receiving stolen
property and theft). But see People v. Clair, 828 P.2d 705, 722 (Cal. 1992) (concluding that,
under McNeil, cases which implemented early versions of the closely related exception
"are no longer vital").
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first cases to apply the exception after McNeil, the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania concluded that "the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
which is offense-specific, to apply to all the offenses arising from
the same incident for which a defendant is charged."93 The court
concluded that the prosecution should not be able "to circumvent
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel merely by charging a de-
fendant with additional related crimes."94 Similarly, in Whittlesey
v. State,95 the Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized that the
application of the exception depended exclusively on whether the
two offenses stemmed from the same set of facts.96 The court
noted that while all the courts require identity of "time, place,
and conduct,"97 some also require the same prosecuting sovereign
92. 616 A.2d 1006 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
93. Id. at 1010-11 (citing Commonwealth v. Santiago, 599 A.2d 200, 202 (Pa. 1991)).
In Pack, a youth was formally charged with theft and appointed an attorney. An officer
questioned him afterward concerning a burglary charge and obtained incriminating
statements. Id. at 1007-08. The court held that these charges "arose from the same inci-
dent" and that the statements should have been suppressed at trial. Id. at 1011.
94. Id. at 1011.
95. 665 A.2d 223 (Md. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1148 (1996).
96. Id. at 235 (citing United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 743-44, (5th Cir. 1991);
In re Michael B., 178 Cal. Rptr. 291, 295-96 (Ct. App. 1981); People v. Clankie, 530 N.E.2d
448, 451-52 (Ill. 1988)). The court identified another instance in which the exception
would apply: cases of police misconduct. Id. This subject is beyond the scope of this Note.
For more information, see the following cases mentioned by the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land: United States v. Martinez, 972 F.2d 1100 (9th Cir. 1992) (remanding for a determi-
nation of whether state prosecutors deliberately dropped charges against the defendant to
facilitate a federal investigation of the same conduct); United States v. Mitcheltree, 940
F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1991) (reversing a witness tampering conviction where the govern-
ment exploited contact between the defendant, who was indicted for a drug offense, and a
government witness, to acquire evidence for both the drug prosecution and a tampering
charge related to contact with witness); United States v. Olsen, 840 F. Supp. 842 (D. Utah
1993) (concluding that there was no misconduct, and that the disputed statements were
admissible in a federal prosecution, where federal agents had elicited statements from the
defendant after the right to counsel had attached with respect to state charge arising from
the same incident).
97. Whittlesey, 665 A.2d at 235 (citing United States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 33 (4th Cir.
1993); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Carpenter, 963 F.2d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257
(9th Cir. 1992); Bruno v. State, 613 A.2d 440, 447 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992), affTd, 632
A.2d 1192 (Md. 1993); Upton v. State, 853 S.W.2d 548, 555-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en
banc).
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for both charges,9" and others look to see if the incriminating
statements served as evidence for both charges.9 9
C. The Miranda Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment is not the only constitutional source of a
right to counsel. The Fifth Amendment states that a person shall
not be "compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself."1' ° In Miranda v. Arizona'' the Court held that the
prosecution may not use statements derived from custodial inter-
rogation of a suspect, unless it can demonstrate the use of proce-
dural safeguards effective in securing the privilege against self-
incrimination.' 2 As for the nature of the procedural safeguards to
be used, the Court held that "unless other fully effective means
are devised to inform accused persons of their right to silence and
to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it," the familiar
warnings must be given to the accused. 10 3 The suspect must be in-
formed that he has the right to remain silent; that if he gives up
that right, anything he says can and will be used against him in
court; that he has the right to an attorney; and that if he cannot
afford an attorney, one will be appointed to represent him.0 4
While the Fifth Amendment addresses the right against self-
incrimination and does not specifically discuss the right to coun-
98. Id. (citing United States v. Williams, 993 F.2d 451, 457 (5th Cir. 1993)); United
States v. Nocella, 849 F.2d 33, 37-38 (1st Cir. 1988); Olsen, 840 F. Supp. at 849.
99. Id. (citing Pack, 616 A.2d at 1010-11).
100. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Unlike the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Fifth
Amendment is not offense-specific. Thus, once the accused has asserted his right to coun-
sel, the police cannot interrogate him about any crime without counsel present as long as
he remains in custody. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 684 (1988).
101. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
102. See id. at 467. Justice Warren, writing for the majority, stated:
We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody
interrogation of persons suspected or accused of a crime contains inherently
compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist
and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In or-
der to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the
privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and ef-
fectively apprised of his rights, and the exercise of those rights must be fully
honored.
Id.
103. Id. at 444.
104. Id. at 479.
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sel,'0 the Miranda court concluded that the right to have an at-
torney present during interrogation is indispensable to the pro-
tection of the Fifth Amendment privilege.' 6 The Miranda opinion
basically superimposed the right to counsel on the prohibition
against compulsory self-incrimination.' ° Thus, the Fifth Amend-
ment right to counsel, which the Court would later refer to as a
"prophylactic rule" rather than a constitutional right,0 " was cre-
ated. 9 The Court only recently determined that Miranda is a
constitutional decision which cannot be overturned by Con-
gress."0
The Fifth and Sixth Amendment counsel protections are not
mutually exclusive. At times, suspects are simultaneously pro-
105. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Sixth Amendment specifically addresses the right to
counsel. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
106. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469. The Court noted that:
The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very
quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his
interrogators. Therefore, the right to have counsel present at the interroga-
tion is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege un-
der the system we delineate today. Our aim is to assure that the individual's
right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout
the interrogation process.
Id.
107. Id. at 461-62.
108. See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 690 (1993) (stating "we have some-
times called the Miranda safeguards 'prophylactic' in nature"); Michigan v. Harvey, 494
U.S. 344, 350 (1990) (referring to the "prophylactic Miranda rules"); Connecticut v. Bar-
rett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987) (stating that "the Miranda Court adopted prophylactic rules
designed to insulate the exercise of Fifth Amendment rights"); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.
298, 309 (1985) (referring to "prophylactic Miranda procedures"); New York v. Quarles,
467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984) (referencing the "prophylactic rules enunciated in Miranda");
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274 (1980) (referring to the "prophylactic require-
ments in Miranda"); see also Meredith B. Halama, Note, Loss of a Fundamental Right:
The Sixth Amendment as a Mere "Prophylactic Rule," 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1207, 1214
(1998) (discussing the Court's misinterpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
by equating it with the Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel). See generally Ogle-
tree, supra note 5 (discussing the Fifth Amendment and Miranda).
109. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 536-37 (White, J., dissenting) ("[Instead of confining itself
to protection of the right against compelled self-incrimination the Court has created a lim-
ited Fifh Amendment right to counsel.")
110. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000). Although the Court con-
ceded that their opinions have shown support for the view that Miranda is a prophylactic
rule, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated that "Miranda is a constitutional
decision." Id. Ironically, in the majority opinion of Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433
(1974), then-Justice Rehnquist stated that the "procedural safeguards" adopted in
Miranda "were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead
measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected"
and to "provide practical reinforcement for the [Fifth Amendment] right." Id. at 444.
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tected by both.11' However, even when they overlap, each provides
a distinct protection with a different purpose.112 The Sixth
Amendment right can be characterized as necessary to the main-
tenance of the adversarial nature of our criminal justice sys-
tem."3 The purpose of this right is to protect the suspect "after
'the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidi-
fied' with respect to a particular alleged crime.""4 The Fifth
Amendment entitlement, on the other hand, is considered vital to
preserving the accusatorial nature of our system."5 The Miranda
rule is designed to protect a "suspect's 'desire to deal with the po-
lice only through counsel""'6 during "custodial interrogation""7
"regarding any suspected crime. ""'
III. FACTS, LOWER COURT DISPOSITION, AND THE HOLDING OF
TEXAS V. COBB
On December 27, 1993, Lindsey Owings notified the Walker
County, Texas Sheriffs Office that his home had been burglar-
ized, and his wife Margaret and sixteen-month-old daughter Kori
Rae were missing." 9 After receiving an anonymous tip, Walker
County police investigators questioned Raymond Cobb, a
neighbor, about the burglary and disappearances. 20 Cobb denied
any involvement in these events.' 2 '
In July of 1994, the police again questioned Cobb, who was un-
der arrest for an unrelated crime.'22 Cobb confessed to the bur-
111. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 395 (1977).
112. See James J. Tomkovicz, Standards for Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in
Confession Contexts, 71 IOWA L. REv. 975, 993 (1986) (discussing the origins and purposes
of Massiah versus Miranda).
113. Id.
114. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177-78 (1991) (quoting United States v. Gou-
veia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984)).
115. Tomkovicz, supra note 112, at 993.
116. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178 (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981)).
117. The Court defined "custodial interrogation" as questioning initiated by the police
in any setting which the suspect was "deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
118. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178 (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981)).
119. Cobb v. State, No. 72,807, 2000 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 32, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App.
Mar. 15, 2000).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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glary of the Owings home, and a grand jury subsequently indicted
Cobb for that crime.'" On August 15, 1994, the court appointed
Hal Ridley to represent Cobb on the burglary charge."
Walker County police investigators thereafter sought Ridley's
permission to question Cobb about the disappearance of Margaret
and Kori Rae. 125 After being assured that Cobb was not consid-
ered a suspect in the disappearances, Ridley granted permis-
sion.126 During the investigators' questioning, Cobb again denied
any involvement. 2 1 On September 13, 1995, investigators again
requested Ridley's permission to question Cobb. 21 Still believing
Cobb was not a suspect, Ridley gave his permission. 9 Cobb con-
tinued to deny involvement in the disappearances. °
On November 11, 1995, the Walker County Sheriffs Office re-
ceived a telephone call from Cobb's father, who resided in Odessa,
Texas.'' Charles Cobb reported that his son, who was free on
bond in the pending burglary case and residing in Odessa, con-
fessed to killing Margaret Owings while burglarizing her home.
32
Charles Cobb gave his statement to the Odessa police, who then
faxed the statement to Walker County.3 3 Soon after, Walker
County faxed an arrest warrant to Odessa. 34 At such time, they
neglected to inform the Odessa police that Cobb had counsel in
the related burglary case.'35
The Odessa police arrested Cobb, read him his Miranda warn-
ings, and proceeded to interrogate him. 136 Cobb waived his
Miranda right to have an attorney present during the interroga-
tion.137 After ninety minutes of questioning, Cobb gave a written
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at *7.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
13L Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at *8.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at *16 (McCormick, J., dissenting).
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statement admitting to the murders of Margaret and Kori Rae
Owings. 3 ' Cobb was found guilty of killing two people in a single
criminal transaction" 9 and sentenced to death. 4 °
On appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was asked to
determine whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had at-
tached to the murder charge.' Cobb asserted that his confession
was obtained by police in violation of his Sixth Amendment right
to counsel because the police initiated interrogation without first
notifying his counsel.' The State argued that, at the time of the
police interrogation, the Sixth Amendment right had not at-
tached.'
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court.'" The
court relied upon "the Sixth Amendment rule that once the right
to counsel attaches to the offense charged, it also attaches to any
other offense that is very closely related factually to the offense
charged."'45 Based on this exception, the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals found that once Cobb was indicted for burglary, his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attached to that offense as well as
the murders because the murders were factually interwoven with
the burglary.'46
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and re-
versed the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.' 47 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that a criminal suspect's
constitutional right to have an attorney present during a custo-
dial interrogation is "offense specific" and does not extend to a po-
lice interrogation into a "factually related" offense. 4'
138. Id; see supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
139. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(7)(A) (Vernon 1994).
140. Cobb, 2000 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 32, at *1.
141. Id. at *11.
142. Id. at *5.
143. Id.
144. Id. at *13.
145. Id. at *10 (citing United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37, 41 (3d Cir. 1997); State v.
Frye, 897 S.W.2d 324, 328-39 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Upton v. State, 853 S.W.2d 548,
555-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc)). See supra notes 72-99 and accompanying text
for a discussion of "closely related" exception.
146. Cobb, 2000 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 32, at *11.
147. Texas v. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. 1335, 1344 (2001).
148. Id. at 1340 (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991)).
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court majority, in a 5-4 decision, affirmed its
holding in McNeil that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is
"offense specific."49 The Cobb Court resolved the issue raised by
the McNeil dissent, which questioned the circumstances under
which an offense would be considered related to the initial
charge, thus precluding any police-initiated questioning, and
when it would be considered unrelated, allowing police to initiate
questioning after obtaining a Miranda waiver.' The Court an-
swered by declining to recognize that Brewer and Moulton sup-
ported an exception to the offense-specific rule for crimes that are
"factually related" to a charged offense.' 5' The Court applied the
Fifth Amendment Blockburger test'52 to Sixth Amendment of-
fenses,'53 despite the McNeil dissent's hopes that the offense-
specific "boundaries will not be patterned after the Court's double
jeopardy jurisprudence." 54
1. The Fifth Amendment is a Protector of the Sixth Amendment
Right to Counsel
The Court emphasized the importance of a suspect's right
against self-incrimination.' Because of this right, law enforce-
ment officers would not be permitted to initiate "unwanted and
uncounseled interrogations."'55 In cases where the Sixth Amend-
ment right has not attached to uncharged offenses, the Court re-
minded the dissent that a suspect must still be advised of his
Miranda rights.'57 The majority stated that "[c]uriously, while
predicting disastrous consequences for the core values underlying
149. Id. at 1339; see supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
150. See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 187 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
15L See Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1340-42.
152. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); infra notes 163-69
and accompanying text.
153. See Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1343.
154. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 187 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. Cobb, 121S. Ct. at 1342.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1343 n.2.
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the Sixth Amendment,.. . the dissenters give short shrift to the
Fifth Amendment's role.., in protecting a defendant's right to
consult with counsel before talking to police." 5 ' The accused re-
serves the right under Miranda to decline answering police ques-
tions regarding any uncharged offenses. 159 Therefore, the Cobb
decision, according to the majority's reasoning, would have little
impact on a suspect's ability to assert his Sixth Amendment right
to counsel.160 Furthermore, the Court felt it crucial to point out
that "the Constitution does not negate society's interest in the
ability of police to talk to witnesses and suspects, even those who
have been charged with other offenses."' 6' The Court stressed a
"law and order" philosophy by reiterating its reasoning in McNeil
that confessions resulting from Miranda waivers are "essential to
society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing
those who violate the law."
62
2. The Blockburger Test is Applicable to the Sixth Amendment
Right to Counsel
The Court reemphasized its endorsement of Fifth Amendment
case law by incorporating an established test into Sixth Amend-
ment cases. The Court has traditionally defined "same offense" in
the double jeopardy arena by applying the Blockburger test:'63
"where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine
whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each pro-
vision requires proof of a fact which the other does not."6" Courts,
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. Because the suspect is being questioned on a charge other than the one for
which he had requested counsel, "there is not the remotest chance that [the accused] will
feel 'badgered' by [the police] asking to talk to him without counsel present." McNeil v.
Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 180 (1991).
161. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1343.
162. Id. (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S. at 181).
163. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 527 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Block-
burger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).
164. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. The defendant in Blockburger claimed that his con-
viction on two separate drug-selling charges was improper because both charges involved
the same sale and, thus, the same offense. Id. at 301-02. He argued that he had commit-
ted only one offense; therefore, only one penalty could be imposed. Id. at 301. The Court
rejected this argument, finding that, although the defendant had made only one sale, the
applicable test revealed that the two offenses were not the same since each of these of-
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accordingly, must focus on the statutory elements of the offenses
charged and determine whether they constitute the "same of-
fense."65
In Cobb, the Court acknowledged that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel is linked to charged offenses only; nevertheless,
"the definition of an 'offense' is not necessarily limited to the four
corners of a charging instrument."1 66 The Court then extended the
Blockburger test to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel by pro-
fessing that "[w]e see no constitutional difference between the
meaning of the term 'offense' in the contexts of double jeopardy
and of the right to counsel."'67 Regardless of whether the offenses
are formally charged, the Sixth Amendment comprehensively in-
cludes those deemed the same offense under the Blockburger
test.168 The Court, after applying the Blockburger test, deter-
mined that the burglary and the murders were not the same of-
fenses; therefore, Cobb's confession was admissible. 69
The majority criticized the dissent's "closely related" test as be-
ing blind to reality.'7 ° Such a test fails to recognize that law en-
forcement officials often lack a full awareness of the scope and
sequence of the events under investigation.' As a result of this
test, the police would be deterred from interrogating suspects for
fear of violating their Sixth Amendment rights.'72 Therefore, the
Blockburger test would be the optimal test to determine whether
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches because "'the
ready ability to obtain uncoerced confessions is not an evil but an
unmitigated good.'"'73
fenses required "proof of a fact which the other did not." Id. at 304. Justice Scalia, provid-
ing insight into the application of this test, stated: "If it is possible to violate each one
without violating the other, then they cannot constitute the 'same offense." Grady, 495
U.S. at 529 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
165. The Supreme Court in each of its major Double Jeopardy Clause decisions has
recognized Blockburger as the established standard. See Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410,
416 (1980); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977).
166. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1343.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1344.
170. Id. at 1343.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1344.
173. Id. at 1343 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 (1991)). But see Anne
Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection Against Successive Prosecutions in Complex
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B. Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, addressed Michi-
gan v. Jackson"'4 and applauded the majority for not relying on
the "questionable" theory in that case. 1 5 In Jackson, the Court
examined the waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in
the context of a Fifth Amendment waiver of right to counsel, us-
ing Edwards v. Arizona"'6 as its guide." The Jackson Court held
that "if police initiate interrogation after a defendant's assertion,
at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to counsel
[after the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached], any
waiver of the defendant's right to counsel for that police-initiated
interrogation is invalid.""18
The Cobb concurrence reasoned that the Jackson holding
should be doubted because it supersedes a suspect's right to vol-
untarily speak with police."'9 After applying the Fifth Amendment
rulings in Miranda and Edwards, Justice Kennedy determined
that the Jackson rule should be applied only in the event that "a
suspect has made a clear and unambiguous assertion of the right
not to speak outside the presence of counsel." 8 ° Cobb failed to
make such an assertion.'8 '
After praising the majority, the concurrence criticized the dis-
sent for defending Jackson."2 Justice Kennedy rejected the dis-
Criminal Cases: A Model, 25 CONN. L. REV. 95, 101 (1992) (noting how the Blockburger
test is not a satisfactory guide in all situations).
174. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
175. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1344 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
176. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). The Edwards Court held that an accused person in custody
who has "expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to
further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him,
unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations
with the police." Id. at 484-85.
177. See Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636. The Court's Sixth Amendment waiver analysis was
first developed in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Considering an alleged waiver of
a federal felony defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Court attested that it
would "indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitu-
tional rights." Id. at 464 (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937)).
178. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636. The Court's decisions in Massiah and Moulton likewise
suggest that law enforcement officials may not bypass counsel by communicating directly
with the accused.
179. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1344 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 1345 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
181. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
182. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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sent's position that the rule should exclude Cobb's confession.8 3
In the concurrence's view, acceptance of counsel at an arraign-
ment or at other proceedings should not equate acceptance of
counsel for every event.'" The majority sought to prevent such an
all-encompassing result because it would eliminate the possibility
of voluntary confessions." 5
C. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Breyer, writing for the dissent, concluded that the im-
portance of Cobb revolved around the meaning of "offense" as it is
related to the Sixth Amendment and incorporated into "offense
specific."'86 The dissent noted that these words do not appear in
the text of the Constitution itself, but instead surfaced in the
Court's case law.'87 In light of this fact, the dissent would have
held that "offense" should be defined "in terms of the conduct that
constitutes the crime that the offender committed on a particular
occasion, including criminal acts that are 'closely related to' or
'inextricably intertwined with' the particular crime set forth in
the charging instrument."' 8
1. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel is Independent of the
Fifth Amendment
In the dissent's view, a suspect's additional protections under
the Sixth Amendment have been undermined by the majority's
and the concurrence's belief that the Fifth Amendment provides a
suspect "adequate constitutional protection."8 9 Jackson illus-
trated how the Miranda warnings may not be adequate for sus-
pects who are frightened or uneducated. 90 The dissent reminded
the concurrence that the Jackson holding relied upon "the fact
that the accused 'had asked for the help of a lawyer' in dealing
183. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
184. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
185. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
186. Id. at 1346 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
187. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 1350 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 1346 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 1347 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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with the police."' 9 ' It is critical, Justice Breyer explained, that po-
lice not force a suspect who has requested legal counsel to make a
critical decision without the professional advice of that counsel.'92
But that should not mean, as the concurrence believes, that the
suspect may not himself initiate communications with law en-
forcement officials. 193
Unlike the concurrence, the majority did not question the hold-
ing in Jackson.94 Nevertheless, the dissent felt the majority's
reasoning was flawed because its reasoning would allow police to
interrogate those charged with an offense-without first consult-
ing counsel-by simply asking about other related crimes not yet
charged in the indictment.'95 As a result, Sixth Amendment pro-
tections could be greatly diminished.'96 Emphasizing that "[t]he
Constitution does not take away with one hand what it gives with
another,"'97 the dissent asserted that the majority ignored prece-
dent by not recognizing the importance of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel as independent of that provided by the Fifth
Amendment.' 98
2. The Blockburger Test Undermines the Sixth Amendment
Right to Counsel
Unfortunately, the dissent's worries in McNeil' 99 came true in
Cobb when the majority chose to apply an irrelevant test from
Fifth Amendment double jeopardy jurisprudence to the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. °0 Justice Breyer characterized the
191. Id. at 1348 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 1347 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent in McNeil noted that the average
person does not understand the "subtle distinctions" between the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ment rights to counsel. McNeil v.Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 185 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633-34 n.7 (1981)).
193. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1348 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
194. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
195. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 1349 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 1347 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
198. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
199. Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, stated: "The Court therefore does not flesh
out the precise boundaries of its newly created offense-specific limitation on a venerable
constitutional right. I trust its boundaries will not be patterned after the Court's double
jeopardy jurisprudence." McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 187 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (referring to Blockburger).
200. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1349 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Blockburger test as a failure because it would be unable to resolve
the significant issues concerning the Sixth Amendment.201 Echo-
ing the McNeil dissent's concern that a narrow definition of "of-
fense," like the one relied upon in Blockburger, would give too
much latitude to the police in "[filing] charges selectively in order
to preserve opportunities for custodial interrogation,"2 °2 the Cobb
dissent enumerated the multiple offenses with which a suspect
could be charged arising out of a single incident of conduct.2 3 For
example, a person using and selling drugs on a single occasion
might be charged with possession of drugs, conspiracy to sell
drugs, possession of drug paraphernalia, and being under the in-
fluence of drugs.204 The disastrous effects of such an example, the
dissent advocated, would be eviscerated if courts employed the
"closely related" test.
20 5
Furthermore, the Blockburger test has proven difficult to ap-
ply, and courts have often disagreed about its proper applica-
tion.2 ' The dissent opined that the majority ignored Block-
burger's difficulties by asking law enforcement officials to apply
the test when questioning suspects.20 7 Justice Breyer concluded
that the use of the technical definition of "offense" as established
by Blockburger would not only weaken the protections afforded
suspects by the Sixth Amendment, but would also fail to improve
effective police investigations.0 '
V. IMPACT OF COBB
A. The Fifth Amendment's Effect on the Sixth Amendment Right
to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been part of the
United States' adversarial system for over 200 years.20 9 On the
201. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
202. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 187 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1348 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
204 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 1350 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
206. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
207. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 1349 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
209. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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other hand, the United States Supreme Court articulated the
Fifth Amendment right to counsel thirty-five years ago in
Miranda, and that right extends only to protect against self-
incrimination.21 ° The McNeil Court noted that the rights have dif-
fering purposes:
The purpose of the Sixth Amendment counsel guarantee-and hence
the purpose of invoking it-is to "protec[t] the unaided layman at
critical confrontations" with his "expert adversary," the government,
after "the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidi-
fied" with respect to a particular alleged crime.... The purpose of
the Miranda-Edwards guarantee, on the other hand-and hence the
purpose of invoking it-is to protect quite a different interest: the
suspect's "desire to deal with the police only through counsel."21 '
Even Rehnquist, the author of Cobb's majority opinion, once
believed that at least one Fifth Amendment rule should not be
applied outside the context of the Fifth Amendment.2 12 The Court,
however, now ignores those differences, thereby belittling the im-
portance of the Sixth Amendment as an essential equalizing force
between the accused and the state.
The majority in McNeil admitted that "[lilt can be said, per-
haps, that it is likely that one who has asked for counsel's assis-
tance in defending against a prosecution would want counsel pre-
sent for all custodial interrogation, even interrogation unrelated
to the charge."213 In Jackson, the Court agreed with the Michigan
Supreme Court's comments regarding an accused's request for
counsel:
Although judges and lawyers may understand and appreciate the
subtle distinctions between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to
counsel, the average person does not. When an accused requests an
attorney, either before a police officer or a magistrate, he does not
know which constitutional right he is invoking; he therefore should
not be expected to articulate exactly why or for what purposes he is
seeking counsel. It makes little sense to afford relief from further in-
210. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (quoting United States v. Gou-
veia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984)).
211. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177-78 (1991) (citations omitted).
212. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 637 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("Does the Edwards rule make sense in the context of the Sixth Amendment? I think it
does not, and I therefore dissent from the Court's unjustified extension of the Edwards
rule to the Sixth Amendment.').
213. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178.
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terrogation to a defendant who asks a police officer for an attorney,
but permit further interrogation to a defendant who makes an iden-
tical request to a judge. The simple fact that defendant has re-
quested an attorney indicates that he does not believe that he is suf-
ficiently capable of dealing with his adversaries singlehandedly. 214
The accused should receive the benefit of the doubt. The Court
has admitted that the average defendant does not understand the
difference between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to
counsel sufficiently enough to know which right he is invoking.
Nevertheless, the Court in Cobb chose to weigh the benefit of the
doubt in favor of the police, irrespective of suggestions that
Miranda warnings are not an effective tool for informing suspects
of their privilege against self-incrimination and their right to con-
sult with counsel prior to making any statements.215
Under Miranda, the police must advise a suspect of his
rights.216 It is important to recognize, however, that these officials
have little interest in protecting the suspect's right to a waiver
made "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." 7 Because their
objective is to obtain a confession, it is unlikely that they will
fully inform the suspect of his right to counsel or his right to re-
main silent, or eliminate any misconceptions about those
214. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 633-34 n.7 (quoting People v. Bladel, 365 N.W.2d 56, 67
(Mich. 1984)). However, in McNeil, the majority felt that these comments "are assuredly
not true in the quite different context of deciding whether such a request implies a desire
never to undergo custodial interrogation, about anything, without counsel present."
McNeil, 501 U.S. at 180 n.1. The McNeil dissent argued that it was still "the commonsense
reality that petitioner in this case could not have known that his invocation of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel was restricted to the Milwaukee County offense, given that
investigations of the Milwaukee County offense and [the other offense] were concurrent
and conducted by overlapping personnel." Id. at 186 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a related
discussion, see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66-71 (1932), in which the Court held:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not com-
prehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged
with crime [sic], he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself
whether the indictment is good or bad.... Left without the aid of counsel he
may be put on trial without a proper charge.... He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of con-
viction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
Id. at 68-69.
215. See Ogletree, supra note 5, at 1827-28.
216. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
217. Id.
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rights.2" The majority in Cobb has hindered the ability of the in-
nocent, as well as the guilty, to participate on an even playing
field with their adversaries. Society will be the ultimate loser
when courts do not maintain the rights of the accused, and it ap-
pears impossible to sustain such rights when the accused are not
fully informed.
B. The Blockburger Test's Effect on the Sixth Amendment Right
to Counsel
It is important to note that the Blockburger test is textually
oriented and, therefore, requires a rather strict interpretation of
"same offense."212 As a result, courts have encountered problems
in certain situations when trying to implement this narrow test
and still protect defendants' rights,22 ° prompting Chief Justice
Rehnquist to describe the test as a "veritable Sargasso Sea which
could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator."22
If courts have difficulty applying the test, so too may police offi-
cers struggle due to their responsibility to determine whether
counsel may be present at interrogations. Furthermore, the Court
has recognized other tests to determine whether successive prose-
cutions impermissibly involve the same offense.222 Nevertheless,
218. The Miranda Court emphasized the pressures placed on suspects subjected to cus-
todial interrogation:
An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, sur-
rounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to [police] techniques of [psy-
chological] persuasion... cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to
speak. As a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting
of the police station may well be greater than in courts or other official inves-
tigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard against intimi-
dation or trickery.
Id. at 461.
219. Justice Scalia advocated a very literal definition for "same offense," referring to
various dictionaries to determine the meaning of the term. See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S.
508, 528 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220. Justice Brennan recognized that the Court has "not relied exclusively on the
Blockburger test." Id. at 519; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Sim-
ple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807, 1814 (1997) ("Blockburger, it seems, is a mess, legally and logi-
cally.").
221. Texas v. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. 1335, 1350 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Al-
bernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981)).
222. In Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977), the Court endorsed the principle that suc-
cessive prosecutions require a broader double jeopardy clause protection than that offered
by the required evidence test:
The Blockburger [required evidence] test is not the only standard for deter-
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the majority in Cobb determined that Blockburger is the standard
to be implemented in Sixth Amendment cases,223 despite its belief
that the test is not a satisfactory guide in every situation.
As a result of its focus on the elements of the charged offenses,
the test has been found inadequate due to the vast number and
overlapping nature of offenses with which a suspect can be
charged.24 The definitional nature of crimes has substantially
changed over time. Early American common law severely limited
the number of offenses for which a person could be charged.225
Today, however, there are countless offenses distinguishable only
by subtle differences. It is highly possible that a prosecutor would
divide a crime in such a manner that a defendant could be sub-
jected to numerous criminal proceedings for essentially the same
conduct. 6 Because any type of distinct element makes otherwise
identical offenses "different" under Blockburger, and modern leg-
mining whether successive prosecutions impermissibly involve the same of-
fense. Even if two offenses are sufficiently different to permit the imposition
of consecutive sentences, successive prosecutions will be barred in some cir-
cumstances where the second prosecution requires the relitigation of factual
issues already resolved by the first.
Id. at 166-67 n.6.
223. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1343. The Court commented that "we could just as easily de-
scribe the Sixth Amendment as 'prosecution specific,' insofar as it prevents discussion of
charged offenses as well as offenses that, under Blockburger, could not be the subject of a
later prosecution." Id. at 1343 n.3.
224. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 n.10 (1970) (noting that "with the advent of
specificity in draftsmanship and the extraordinary proliferation of overlapping and related
statutory offenses, it became possible for prosecutors to spin out a startlingly numerous
series of offenses from a single alleged criminal transaction"). Justice Breyer offers these
examples:
[An armed robber who reaches across a store counter, grabs the cashier, and
demands "your money or your life," may through that single instance of con-
duct have committed several "offenses," in the majority's sense of the term,
including armed robbery, assault, battery, trespass, use of a firearm to com-
mit a felony, and perhaps possession of a firearm by a felon, as well.... A
protester blocking the entrance to a federal building might also be trespass-
ing, failing to disperse, unlawfully assembling, and obstructing Government
administration all at one and the same time.
Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1348 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
225. Only 160 offenses existed at the time the Bill of Rights was ratified. Note, Statu-
tory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for a Moribund Constitutional
Guarantee, 65 YALE L.J. 339, 342 n.14 (1956).
226. See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 509, 520 (1990) (noting that if the Blockburger test
were applied to the facts of the case, the defendant could be tried four separate times for
one criminal act); Ashe, 397 U.S. at 451 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that a prosecutor
could bring numerous charges if the offense affected several victims, if the criminal action
could be divided into chronologically discrete crimes, or if it was illegal under numerous
different statutes).
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islatures pass many overlapping statutes, real-life examples of
Blockburger's failure abound. For example, assault with intent to
murder is a different Blockburger offense from assault with in-
tent to rob while armed.227 The same assault can be punished as
many times as the legislature articulates distinct intent require-
ments: to murder, to rape, to sodomize, to rob, to kidnap, and to
2281injure.
Given the usefulness of questioning an uncounseled defendant,
Cobb provides a strong incentive for prosecutors to extend the
charging process, making already vulnerable defendants even
more susceptible to government harassment. Cobb also elimi-
nates any assurance previously offered by Jackson that once ar-
raigned, the defendant will be free from further interrogation
without counsel's consent, unless that defendant is charged with
every possible offense from the start.229 Cobb forces defendants,
even those who have obtained counsel on the specific matter
charged, to rely on their own instincts in dealing with the gov-
ernment in any on-going investigation.23 °
C. The "Closely Related" Test is the Most Workable Test
The Cobb dissent recognized the imperfections of the "closely
related" test;23' nevertheless, lower courts continue to include
closely-related acts in their definition of "offense."232 Moreover, as
the dissent illustrated, it is consistent with precedent that "the
Court's conception of the Sixth Amendment right at the time that
Moulton and Brewer were decided naturally presumed that it ex-
tended to factually related but uncharged offenses."2 33 Thus, the
"closely related" test should be considered the common-sense ap-
proach 2 34 that strengthens the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
227. People v. Bryan, 284 N.W.2d 765, 772-73 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
228. See supra note 224 for other examples.
229. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633-34 n.7 (1986).
230. Texas v. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. 1335, 1351 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
231. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 1350 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing note 5 of the majority opinion which lists
cases from both federal and state courts). See supra notes 72-99 and accompanying text
for discussion of cases recognizing the "closely related" exception.
233. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1349 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 1351 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The rule that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-
specific does not comport with the broad scope of the attorney-
client relationship:
The scope of the relationship between an individual accused of crime
and his attorney is as broad as the subject matter that might rea-
sonably be encompassed by negotiations for a plea bargain or the
contents of a presentence investigation report. Any notion that a
constitutional right to counsel is, or should be, narrowly defined by
the elements of a pending charge is both unrealistic and invidious.
Moreover, for every possible criminal charge that may stem
from a single incident, must courts appoint different attorneys for
defendants who cannot afford counsel? One can only imagine the
confusion. The "closely related" test eliminates such possibilities
by extending the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to offenses
that arise from a single occasion.236
Despite its imperfections, it appears that judges have found the
"closely related" test workable. Some courts have defined offenses
as "closely related" if they involve the same victim, acts, evidence,
or intent."7 Others have defined offenses that do not constitute
"closely related.""8 In applying the test to Cobb, the dissent
agreed with the reasoning of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
that burglary and murder were "closely related" offenses.29
Cobb's confessions should have been suppressed because the
court appointed counsel for a crime arising out of the same facts
as the murder. The murder was an offshoot of the burglary, and
Cobb's Sixth Amendment right to counsel should therefore have
attached. In the end, it would appear that the majority is
235. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 187 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
236. See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
237. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1350 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Taylor v. State, 726 So. 2d
841, 845 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Tucker, 645 A.2d 111, 120-21 (N.J. 1994), cert. de-
nied, 513 U.S. 1090 (1995); In re Pack, 616 A.2d 1006, 1010 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)).
238. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Commonwealth v. Rainwater, 681 N.E.2d 1218,
1224 (Mass. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1095 (1998); Whittlesey v. State, 665 A.2d 223,
236 (Md. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1148 (1996); People v. Dotson, 574 N.E.2d 143, 149
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991)).
239. Id. at 1351 (Breyer, J., dissenting). When questioning Cobb, the police were aware
that he had an attorney representing him on the burglary charges. Id. (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing). Moreover, the police appeared to have acted in the belief that this counsel was also
representing Cobb on the possible murder charges, because they requested his permission
to question Cobb on previous occasions. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). The "relatedness of the
crimes is well illustrated by the impossibility of questioning Cobb about the murders with-
out eliciting admissions about the burglary." Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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blind to the reality that courts have found the "closely related
test" workable.24 °
VI. CONCLUSION
In Texas v. Cobb, the United States Supreme Court once again
had to define the parameters of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. The Court had two options: expand or constrict. In the
end, the Court chose the latter, deciding that the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel does not extend to factually related un-
charged offenses.24'
The majority's reasoning diminishes the Sixth Amendment
right by effectively asserting that the Fifth Amendment is ade-
quate protection for suspects.242 The Fifth Amendment right to
counsel, however, is an entitlement, not a constitutional right like
that provided by the Sixth Amendment.243 The Court appears to
analyze the rights in the same manner simply because they both
include a "right to counsel" and require a "knowing and intelli-
gent" waiver.2" As a result of this merger, the Court chose to ap-
ply the Fifth Amendment Blockburger test to the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel.245 However, as the Fifth Amendment and
Sixth Amendment have different goals and purposes, the tests
applied to these amendments should remain distinctly different.
Therefore, the test to determine what constitutes an offense in
the context of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should be
the "closely related" test.
Furthermore, the majority focused on a concept that is not
stated in the Constitution: "society's interest in the ability of po-
lice to talk to witnesses and suspects, even those who have been
charged with other offenses."2 46 According to Justice Goldberg in
Escobedo v. Illinois:
247
240. See supra notes 72-99 and accompanying text.
241. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1339.
242. See id. at 1347 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
243. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
244. See Halama, supra note 108, at 1223.
245. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1344.
246. Id. at 1343.
247. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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We have also learned the companion lesson of history that no system
of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to depend for its
continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication through unaware-
ness of their constitutional rights. No system worth preserving
should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a
lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, these rights. If the ex-
ercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a sys-
tem of law enforcement, then there is something wrong with that
system.
2 48
Nevertheless, the Cobb ruling gives more power to the police by
encouraging them to work around a suspect's constitutional
rights, regardless of the effect it will have on our adversarial sys-
tem. Cobb opted to narrowly define the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel by favoring law enforcement officials over the accused
and by dismissing the "closely related" exception that lower
courts have applied.249
The question thus remains: how far will the Court. go in nar-
rowing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel? Hopeftlly, it has
gone far enough.
Beth G. Hungate-Noland
248. Id. at 490.
249. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1343.
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